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Symposium: Forum Selection After
Atlantic Marine

Atlantic Marine and Choice-of-Law Federalism
Andrew D. Bradt*
The headline holding of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Atlantic Marine is its
conclusion that a forum-selection clause is usually enforceable under the federal
transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Also lurking within the opinion, however, is a
significant shift in the Court’s approach to choice of law in federal courts. In Atlantic
Marine, the Court held that after a transfer to enforce a forum-selection clause, the
transferee district court must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits.
The Court’s rationale is straightforward—the plaintiff should not be allowed to flout
the forum-selection clause and obtain the benefits of more favorable choice-of-law rules
of another state. But the Court’s new rule is a departure from its prior treatment of
choice of law in transfer cases, which provided that after a § 1404(a) transfer the
transferee court must apply the choice-of-law rules of the transferor court, which, in
diversity cases, means the choice-of-law rules of the state in which the transferor court
sits. This rule was based on several longstanding principles of what I call choice-of-law
federalism, which itself is premised on respect for the substantive policies underlying
states’ choice-of-law rules and the refusal to sanction different applicable law in federal
and state courts within the same state—even in the face of evident interstate forum
shopping by plaintiffs. This Article examines how the Court’s abandonment of these
principles creates numerous complications in its jurisprudence under the Erie doctrine
and in choice of law.
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Whatever one’s views on the outcome, one admirable thing about
Justice Alito’s opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court in Atlantic
Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court is its clarity of purpose: the
Court made plain that, except in “extraordinary circumstances,” the
federal courts are to “hold[] parties to their bargain” by enforcing forumselection clauses.1 The ruling mandates that federal courts should almost
always transfer or dismiss cases filed in a forum other than that
denominated by a valid forum-selection clause in order to ensure that
litigation proceeds in the previously agreed-upon forum. Enforcing the
forum-selection clause, according to the Court, ensures that the parties’
expectations are fulfilled and “[i]n all but the most unusual cases” serves
“the interest of justice.”2 One could certainly argue with the Court’s
conclusions, but, as they say in electoral politics, at least you know where it
stands.
Given the Court’s aims, it is unsurprising that at the end of its short
opinion and almost in passing, the Court also held that “when a party
bound by a forum-selection clause flouts its contractual obligation and
files suit in a different forum, a transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
will not carry with it the original venue’s choice-of-law rules.”3 In so
doing, the Court departed from the standard rule, announced in 1964’s
Van Dusen v. Barrack, that when a case is transferred to another federal
forum, the transferee court should apply the choice-of-law rules of the
1. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013).
2. Id. at 583.
3. Id. at 582.
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transferor court—that is, a transfer should not change the applicable law
that would have applied had the case remained in the court where it was
filed.4 In Atlantic Marine, neither party explicitly argued for this
departure from the Van Dusen rule in the briefs, nor was the change
discussed in depth at oral argument.5
But the holding flows naturally from the Court’s intentions. If the
Court was attempting to ensure that the litigation proceeds in the
contractually chosen forum as though the case had never been filed
elsewhere, then it would be odd for the transferee forum to apply
another state’s choice-of-law rules, especially if those rules change the
applicable law. If the Van Dusen rule were to apply in cases like Atlantic
Marine, then the party seeking to enforce the forum-selection clause
would get only half a loaf—the preferred forum, but with a different set
of choice-of-law rules, and often different governing law as a result.
Atlantic Marine therefore ensures that a contractual forum-selection
clause is also a “choice-of-law rules selection” clause. That is, by choosing
a forum in a contract, the parties also choose that forum’s choice-of-law
rules, and therefore, often that forum’s law.
Despite the natural alignment of the Court’s choice-of-law holding
with its stated intentions, its rather cursory statements on the matter are
in tension with its earlier cases dealing with state choice-of-law rules in
diversity cases. For instance, in its earlier opinions involving transfer, the
Court emphasized the transfer statute’s purely “judicial housekeeping”
function—as the Court stated in Van Dusen, a federal court transfer
accomplishes only a “change of courtrooms,” not a change in law.6 And,
although the Court has long recognized the interstate forum-shopping
possibilities created by Van Dusen, its predecessor Klaxon v. Stentor,7 and
its successor Ferens v. John Deere Co.,8 the Court has typically
subordinated those concerns to other priorities: namely, rejecting
intrastate forum shopping in diversity cases and refusing to become
enmeshed in judgments about arguable gamesmanship involved in the
plaintiff’s choice of forum and its impact on choice-of-law rules.
The holdings in Klaxon and Van Dusen rested on an additional
underpinning, which is also developed in the Court’s decisions reviewing
states’ choices of law under the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
clauses: that a state’s choice-of-law rules in a case in which it has jurisdiction
are a part of that state’s substantive law because they reflect the state’s

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

376 U.S. 612, 636–37 (1964).
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 25–26, 42–43, Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568 (No. 12-929).
Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 637.
313 U.S. 487 (1941).
494 U.S. 516 (1990).
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policies regarding both the scope of its laws and interstate relations.9 A
majority of the Court reaffirmed this approach to the choice-of-law
implications of the transfer statute in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp.10 In Stewart, the majority, relying on Van Dusen, based its holding
that the transfer statute was procedural for Erie purposes, in part, on the
fact that a transfer would not change the choice-of-law rules applicable to
a case.11 Together, the cases demonstrate that the Court has steadfastly
avoided (1) crafting federal choice-of-law rules for diversity cases,
(2) second-guessing states’ choice-of-law decisions, or (3) changing the
state choice-of-law rules applicable to a case due to parties’ attempts to
forum shop.12
The Court’s recent commitment to enforcing forum-selection
clauses may require it to depart from these practices. By creating an
exception to the Van Dusen rule and allowing the federal transfer statute
to be a vehicle for changing the applicable law in Atlantic Marine, the
Court has placed itself in the role of policing the choice-of-law impact of
plaintiffs’ forum shopping, even when they select a forum otherwise
allowed by the venue statute and personal jurisdiction doctrine. The
Court’s new rule thus amplifies the status of the transfer statute beyond
mere “housekeeping” and prioritizes the federal policies of enforcing
forum-selection clauses and preventing inappropriate forum choices by
plaintiffs over ensuring intrastate uniformity and leaving untouched
states’ choice-of-law rules in cases in which they have jurisdiction. This
may be a reasonable rule in the context of enforcing forum-selection
clauses, by virtue of which the Court contends that plaintiffs have waived
their right to select an alternative forum.13 But it does represent a shift in
the Court’s thinking about choice-of-law rules, and it may indicate that
the Court will continue to craft exceptions to the Van Dusen rule when it
thinks plaintiffs are engaging in inappropriate forum shopping.14

9. See Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496 (“[Erie] leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the
Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors. It is not for the
federal courts to thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent ‘general law’ of conflict of
laws.”); see also Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to
CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 21 (2012); Russell J. Weintraub, The Erie Doctrine
and State Conflicts of Laws Rules, 39 Ind. L.J. 228, 242 (1963) (“[T]he choice-of-law rules of a state
are important expressions of its domestic policy.”).
10. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
11. Id. at 32 (“Section 1404(a) is doubtless capable of classification as a procedural rule, and
indeed, we have so classified it in holding that a transfer pursuant to § 1404(a) does not carry with it a
change in the applicable law.” (citing Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 636–37 (1964))).
12. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); see also, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law
and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 440, 444 (1982).
13. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013).
14. See Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 291, 296 (1988) (noting that Atlantic
Marine is the next step in the “quiet revolution” of contractual procedure and jurisdiction).
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Moreover, the Court’s new rule creates a vehicle that allows courts
to police plaintiffs’ strategic choice-of-law behavior without having to
review the content of state courts’ choice-of-law rules. Indeed, aside from
matters of federalism, there are strong prudential reasons for the Court to
avoid passing judgment on states’ choice-of-law rules—among them, not
wanting to take on the tasks of crafting federal choice-of-law rules or
policing state choices of law,15 except in extreme cases.16 The “choice of
choice-of-law rules” rule the Court promulgated in Atlantic Marine,
alongside the Court’s recent restrictive personal jurisdiction decisions,17
allows it to restrict forum and choice-of-law shopping by plaintiffs
without having to strike down a state’s plaintiff-friendly choice-of-law
rule for violating the Due Process or Full Faith and Credit Clauses. In other
words, by restricting the plaintiff’s ability to take advantage of states’
friendly choice-of-law rules, the Court minimizes the need to actually review
the content of those rules. The choice-of-law rule in Atlantic Marine, then,
provides an opportunity for the Court to frustrate plaintiffs’ manipulation
of the opportunities presented by the diversity of states’ choice-of-law
rules without having to address the constitutionality of those rules.
Part I of this Article lays out the doctrinal backdrop of choice-of-law
federalism against which Atlantic Marine was decided. Part II discusses
how the Atlantic Marine decision backs away from the thinking that has
emerged from the Supreme Court’s prior cases. In particular, I note how
the new rule in Atlantic Marine deprioritizes intrastate uniformity. Part
II also discusses how the Court’s focus on the inappropriateness of the
plaintiff’s forum shopping is a departure in this area and, along with the
Court’s recent personal jurisdiction cases, how it provides an avenue to
restrict plaintiffs’ ability to take advantage of the diversity of choice-oflaw rules without passing judgment on the constitutionality of those rules
or their application.

I. The Supreme Court’s Choice-of-Law Federalism Jurisprudence
In a series of cases dealing with choice of law since the 1930s, the
Court has developed a doctrinal framework that takes a decidedly hands-off
approach to horizontal choice-of-law issues. This approach has emerged
15. See Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 Ind. L.J. 271, 295
(1996) (arguing that that the Supreme Court should avoid choice-of-law matters due to “the capacity
of the Supreme Court to oversee enforcement of constitutional reforms”).
16. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
17. See, e.g., Daimler Chrysler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (finding no general jurisdiction in
California over German automaker despite significant sales in California); Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct.
1115 (2014) (finding no specific jurisdiction in plaintiff’s home state of Nevada when defendant committed
allegedly tortious acts in Georgia); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846
(2011) (finding no general jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries in North Carolina in case involving bus
crash in France); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (finding no specific jurisdiction
over British manufacturer in New Jersey despite the fact that its product caused injury there).
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out of three lines of cases: the cases which provide for minimal scrutiny
of states’ choice-of-law decisions under the Due Process and Full Faith
and Credit Clauses, the Erie-progeny cases requiring federal courts
sitting in diversity to apply the choice-of-law rules of the states in which
they sit, and the cases applying the Erie rule in the context of transfers
under § 1404(a). Taken together, these cases established three principles
of what I refer to as “choice-of-law federalism”: (1) a willingness to
accept some degree of forum shopping by plaintiffs that takes advantage
of a diversity of state choice-of-law rules in order to avoid disuniformity
between federal and state courts sitting in the same state; (2) a prudential
refusal to police such gamesmanship on the part of plaintiffs; and (3) a
recognition that a state’s choice-of-law rules are a part of that state’s
substantive law, rarely to be disturbed or departed from in diversity
cases, as a matter of constitutional law. The Court’s new rule in Atlantic
Marine marks a subtle, but real, step away from all three of these
principles in favor of the policy of enforcing forum-selection clauses.
A. The Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Cases
Before the mid-1930s, the Supreme Court heard a significant
number of choice-of-law cases. There were two reasons for this: First, to
a much greater degree, the Supreme Court policed states’ choice-of-law
decisions under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.18 During this time, the Supreme
Court seemed to have considered the territorial rules eventually embodied
by the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws to have a constitutional
dimension, and, as a result, the Court regularly reviewed and invalidated
state choices of law.19 Second, in diversity cases, choice of law was
considered a matter of general law, and federal courts were not required
to follow the choice-of-law decisions of the states in which they sat.20
Neither of these reasons was still applicable by the end of 1941.

18. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
19. See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1631,
1634–36 (2005); see also Peter Hay et al., Conflict of Laws §§ 3.21–3.24 (5th ed. 2010) (describing
the evolution of the Court’s conflicts jurisprudence).
20. See, e.g., Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 761 (1st Cir. 1940) (“Under Swift v. Tyson, . . . the
federal courts were free to disregard state court decisions on matters of ‘general law’, and this included
state court decisions on the common law relating to conflict of laws.”); see also William F. Baxter,
Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 31 (1963) (“It is clear, then, that from the
founding of the federal government through [Erie,] the federal courts exercised independent judgment
on choice [of law] rules.”); Paul A. Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 Harv. L.
Rev. 1210, 1212 (1946) (describing that “spacious era before the Erie case, when federal judges in
diversity were more than echoes of half-heard whispers of the state tribunals”).
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In the 1930s,21 coming on the heels of rampant academic criticism of
the territorial rules of the First Restatement,22 the Supreme Court
explicitly recognized, as Paul Freund described, “there are at least two
possibly applicable rules or systems of law in a multistate problem.”23
Rather than requiring that one state’s law govern in a multistate case, in
two important decisions authored by Justice Stone, the Court came to
the view that in most cases, the Constitution “does not require one state
to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within
it, the conflicting statute of another state even though that statute is of
controlling force in the courts of the state of its enactment with respect to
the same persons and events.”24 As a result, in Professor Freund’s words,
these decisions established that “within limits, there is room for
assertiveness as well as reticence in our family of states.”25
The Court has maintained this lenient approach to constitutional
supervision of states’ choice-of-law rules ever since. The current
controlling case in the area remains 1981’s Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague, which allows a state to apply the law of the forum so long as it has
“a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state
interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally
unfair.”26 Although Hague is unpopular among conflicts scholars,27 one
thing about it is clear: the extremely loose standards promulgated in
Allstate took the Supreme Court out of the business of rigorously
policing states’ choice-of-law rules.28 The Court seemed to take a step in

21. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Acc. Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) (holding that different states
may constitutionally apply their own law to the same set of facts); Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Acc.
Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) (holding that a state may constitutionally apply its own law even though
a different state with jurisdiction would apply that state’s own law).
22. See, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws
(1942); see also Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice of Law Methodology,
60 Cornell L. Rev. 927, 929–30 (1975) (describing critiques of the First Restatement).
23. Freund, supra note 20, at 1210.
24. Pac. Emp’rs, 306 U.S. at 502; see also Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial
Application of American Law, 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 179, 209.
25. Freund, supra note 20, at 1222; see also Weinberg supra, note 19, at 1637 (noting the “liberating
insight” of the “innovative Supreme Court cases of the 1930s” that “in a two-state case in tort, the law
chosen did not have to be the law of the place of the injury . . . nor, indeed, of any other single place”).
26. 449 U.S. 302, 312 (1981).
27. See Hay et al., supra note 19, at 182 (“In sum, the plurality opinion in Hague does not
present an analytical framework.”); Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie’s Governmental Interest
Analysis, 215 Recueil de Cours 145 (1989) (arguing that “the Hague standard . . . is insufficiently
sensitive to the connection between the state’s factual contacts with the case and its governmental
policies”); Linda Silberman, Can The State of Minnesota Bind the Nation?: Federal Choice-of-Law
Constraints After Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 103, 129 (1981).
28. See Weinberg, supra note 12, at 440; Shreve, supra note 15, at 271 (noting “the Supreme Court
rarely intervenes” in conflicts); see also Russell J. Weintraub, Who’s Afraid of Constitutional Limitations
on Choice of Law? 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 17, 34 (1981) (noting that post-Hague, “[i]f a choice of law does
not outrageously surprise one of the parties, it will rarely be held unconstitutional”).
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a more proactive direction in 1985’s Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,29
but then quickly backed away again in 1988’s Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman.30
Overall, since the mid-1930s, the Court has been reluctant to intervene in
rejecting states’ choice-of-law decisions on the merits.
B. Applying ERIE to Choice of Law: KLAXON v. STENTOR
Shortly after the Court reformulated its perspective on choice of
law, it had to deal with the choice-of-law implications of its decision in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and answer the question: would a federal
court sitting in diversity have to follow the choice-of-law rules of the state
in which it sits?31 The circuits split, and in 1941, the Court unanimously
answered “yes” in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.32
Although Justice Reed’s short opinion for a unanimous Court is not
especially detailed in its reasoning, the Court at least handed down a
clear rule: a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-law
rules of the state in which it sits.33 Of its rule, the Court said:
Any other ruling would do violence to the principle of uniformity
within a state, upon which the Tompkins decision is based. Whatever
lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in different
states is attributable to our federal system, which leaves to a state,
within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue
local policies diverging from those of its neighbors. It is not for the
federal courts to thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent
“general law” of conflict of laws.34

The Court also affirmed the consistency of its new rule with the

Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Com. decision

regarding the Constitutional limits on state choice-of-law rules in
upholding the lower court’s right to apply forum law in the case. The Court
stated, “[n]othing in the Constitution ensures unlimited extraterritorial

29. 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (holding that Kansas could not constitutionally apply its law to all claims
in a nationwide class action when most of those claims had no factual connection to Kansas).
30. 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (holding that a state may apply its own statute of limitations to all claims
in a nationwide class action, even to those claims with no factual connection to the forum state); see
also Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 499 (2003) (stating that “[w]ithout a rudder to steer us,
we decline to embark on the constitutional course of balancing coordinate States’ competing sovereign
interests to resolve conflicts of laws under the Full Faith and Credit Clause”); Arthur R. Miller, Reliving
and Reflecting on Shutts, 74 UMKC L. Rev. 505, 509 (2006) (noting that, after Shutts, “[n]ot surprisingly,
the Court has not encouraged other choice-of-law challenges”).
31. Indeed, the Court could have taken this question up on the same day the Erie opinion came
down, but it reserved decision on the question in Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. See 304 U.S. 202, 208 n.2
(1938).
32. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
33. Id. at 496 (“We are of opinion that the prohibition declared in [Erie] against such
independent determinations by the federal courts extends to the field of conflict of laws.”).
34. Id. at 496–97.
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recognition of all statutes or of any statute under all circumstances.”35
The Klaxon opinion, despite its brevity, demonstrates that the Court is
willing to tolerate some interstate forum shopping to preserve the
principle of intrastate uniformity, even if this creates strategic options for
plaintiffs, and that states’ choice-of-law rules are a matter of substantive
law expressing local policy regarding its treatment of its own law in
relation to that of other states.36
As has been well documented, Klaxon has never been universally
beloved and has been criticized by numerous reasonably prominent
commentators.37 Among the early critics, Henry Hart was the most
vociferous.38 Hart’s view was that the Supreme Court had it backwards—
that the evils of interstate forum shopping were far worse than the evils
of disuniformity within a state, and that the federal courts should be in
the business of independently developing choice-of-law rules that would
eventually become uniform among the federal courts and be copied by
the states.39 David Cavers emerged as Klaxon’s chief defender, arguing
that there was little reason to believe that the federal courts would
converge on uniform choice-of-law rules, and if they did, they would opt
for the “lowest common denominator” territorial rules that had been
such a failure in the first place.40 Cavers also firmly believed that a state’s
conflicts rules “identify state policies and determine the significance of

35. Id. at 498 (citing Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm., 306 U.S. 493 (1939)) (upholding
Delaware’s right to apply forum law as opposed to New York law if “such application would interfere
with its local policy”).
36. See Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 759–62 (1st. Cir. 1940), cited with approval in Klaxon,
313 U.S. at 496 n.2; Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 547, 572–
73 (1996) (arguing that choice-of-law rules are a matter of substantive law); Linda S. Mullenix,
Federalizing Choice of Law for Mass-Tort Litigation, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1623, 1647 (1992) (“Federalized
choice of law reduces incentives for horizontal forum shopping across states, but perhaps increases
incentives for vertical forum shopping from state to federal court. If this is true then the proposed
federalized choice-of-law schemes violate Erie in diversity cases.”).
37. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 402 (1964) (“[T]he constitutional basis of Erie does not apply to choice of law
issues even when diversity is the sole basis of federal jurisdiction and a fortiori when it is not.”);
Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins,
55 Yale L.J. 267, 285–87 (1946); Cook, supra note 22, at 136. See generally Linda J. Silberman, Choice
of Law in National Class Actions: Should CAFA Make a Difference?, 14 Roger Williams U. L. Rev.
54, 66 (2009) (noting that “[a]mong conflict of laws cognoscenti, there has always been some general
anti-Klaxon sentiment”).
38. David F. Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 732, 735 (1963) (referring to Hart as an “unrelenting critic”).
39. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489,
514–15 (1954) (arguing that the federal courts “are in a peculiarly disinterested position to make a just
determination as to which state’s laws ought to apply”); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Brandeis
and the Progressive Constitution 251 (2000) (noting that Hart “despised Klaxon”).
40. David F. Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process 220–22 (1965) (“What the new freedom of the
federal courts would bring would not be a new set of normative principles or a discriminating effort to narrow
the issues in choice-of-law cases but a nostalgic search for a doctrinal lowest common denominator.”).
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those policies in their application or non-application in interstate
situations,” and that federal courts in diversity cases should not overrule
those rules.41 In any event, despite all of the persistent criticism, the
Supreme Court has never backed away from the Klaxon doctrine.42 Nor
has Congress expressed much interest in overruling it.43
Taken together, the Allstate and Klaxon doctrines establish a
hands-off approach to state choice-of-law rules. Both decisions recognize
the substantive nature of states’ choice-of-law decisions and refuse to
sanction federal intervention.
C. Choice of Law and Transfers Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

Klaxon came down prior to the 1948 passage of the federal transfer
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The statute created the expedient of transfer
to a more appropriate federal district “[f]or the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice.”44 The transfer process was much
more streamlined than a dismissal for forum non conveniens followed by
a refiling in a new district court as would have been required before the
enactment of § 1404(a).45 The statute created a new dilemma, though.
Prior to its passage, when a diversity case was dismissed and refiled in a
new federal district, the new district court, following Klaxon, applied the
choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sat. After the enactment of
§ 1404(a), a court receiving a transferred case faced the question of
whether to apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which the transferor
court was located or those of its own state.46
The Court resolved the problem in 1964’s Van Dusen v. Barrack.47
Van Dusen involved the crash of an airplane that had taken off from
Boston and was bound for Philadelphia.48 The plane crashed into the
Boston Harbor shortly after takeoff. Some 150 plaintiffs filed actions for

41. David F. Cavers, Change in Choice-of-Law Thinking and its Bearing on the Klaxon Problem,
in American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal
Courts 154, 165–66 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1963); see Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the
Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1924, 1940 (2006)
(describing the disagreement between Hart and Klaxon’s defenders).
42. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (reaffirming Klaxon); Gene R.
Shreve, Conflicts Law—State or Federal?, 68 Ind. L.J. 907, 910 n.20 (1993) (noting that the Court has
“not wavered” on Klaxon).
43. Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Choice of Law, 14 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 12, 22 (2009).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
45. See generally 15 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3841
(4th ed. 2013).
46. See Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial
System, 93 Yale L.J. 677, 682 (1984) (“Almost from the beginning, section 1404(a) created a new species
of choice-of-law problem in diversity cases.”); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, The Law
of Multistate Problems 1383–84 (1965) (noting the dilemmas created by the transfer statute).
47. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
48. Id. at 613.
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personal injury or wrongful death, some in the District of Massachusetts,
and others in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.49 Jurisdiction and
venue were proper in both districts, but the defendant airlines sought to
transfer the cases filed in Philadelphia to the federal court in Boston.50 In
short, the problem for the Philadelphia wrongful death plaintiffs was that
if a transfer resulted in the application of Massachusetts rather than
Pennsylvania law, the cases would either be dismissed or their damages
would be capped much more stringently.51 Stating, “[T]he potential
prejudice to the plaintiffs is so substantial as to require review of the
assumption that a change of state law would be a permissible result of
transfer,”52 the Van Dusen Court held that the transfer statute was a
mere “housekeeping measure.”53 Thus, the Court held, “in cases such as
the present, where the defendants seek transfer, the transferee district
court must be obligated to apply the state law that would have been
applied if there had been no change of venue.”54
In so holding, the Van Dusen Court held firm to the “fundamental
Erie doctrine” principles underlying the Klaxon decision.55 First, the
Court was willing to accept some degree of interstate disuniformity to
preserve the principle of intrastate federal uniformity. Stating that “the
critical identity to be maintained is between the federal district court
which decides the case and the courts of the State in which the action was
filed”56 the Court stressed that courts
should ensure that the “accident” of federal diversity jurisdiction does
not enable a party to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal
court which could not have been achieved in the courts of the State
where the action was filed. This purpose would be defeated in cases
such as the present if nonresident defendants, properly subjected to
suit in the transferor state (Pennsylvania) could invoke § 1404(a) to
gain the benefits of the laws of another jurisdiction (Massachusetts).57

Second, almost apologetically, the Court expressed its willingness to
tolerate gamesmanship on the part of the plaintiff to achieve the choiceof-law benefits of her chosen forum:

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 613–14.
Id. at 614.
Id. at 627–28.
Id. at 630.
Id. at 636–37.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 638.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 638.
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Of course [the rule] allow[s] plaintiffs to retain whatever advantages may
flow from the state laws of the forum they have initially selected. There
is nothing, however, in the language or policy of § 1404(a) to justify its
use by defendants to defeat the advantages accruing to plaintiffs who have
chosen a forum which, although it was inconvenient, was a proper venue.58

Third, the Court rejected calls from critics who posited that in
transfer cases, the federal courts should follow the choice-of-law rules of
transferee courts, and critics of Klaxon who believed the federal courts
should develop their own choice-of-law common law in transfer cases.59
Indeed, the Court based its opinion, in part, on the fact that the legislative
history of § 1404(a) “indicate[d] that it should be regarded as a judicial
housekeeping measure” because Congress had said nothing about a
change of venue effecting a change in law.60
Van Dusen explicitly left two questions unanswered. The Court
stated, “[w]e do not attempt to determine whether, for example, the
same considerations would govern if a plaintiff sought transfer under
§ 1404(a) or if it was contended that the transferor State would simply
have dismissed the action on the ground of forum non conveniens.”61
The Van Dusen holding was, therefore, expressly limited to cases in
which a federal court transferred a case pursuant to the standards of
§ 1404(a) at a defendant’s request, but which would not be dismissed on
forum non conveniens grounds by a state court of the transferor state.
The Court has not addressed the second of these open questions.
Under such circumstances, at least post-Atlantic Marine, one could

58. Id. at 633–34.
59. See id. at 639 n.39 (citing Irving R. Kaufman, Observations on Transfers Under § 1404(a) of the
New Judicial Code, 10 F.R.D. 595, 601 (1951)). The Court also recognized Professor Brainerd Currie’s
change of heart on this issue in this footnote. Currie originally believed that the federal courts should
abandon Klaxon and develop their own choice-of-law rules in transfer cases to decide whether to apply
the law of the transferor or transferee state. See Brainerd Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of
Laws, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 405, 497 (1955). But Currie later came to the view that his original position
was “hopelessly wrong” on the grounds that this would “produce a difference of result in state and
federal courts that will be difficult to reconcile with the Erie doctrine” and that “a federal court should
be bound as firmly to apply the state court’s construction of the law in its application to cases having
foreign aspects as it is bound to apply the state court’s construction of the law in its application to
marginal domestic situations and preexisting conditions.” See Brainerd Currie, Change of Venue and
the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 341, 344, 347, 349 (1960). Currie began his
second article by stating, “The [previous] article was not without merit . . . . Indeed, there is only one
reason for regretting the article or offering apologies for it: The conclusion reached was wrong—not
just plain wrong, but fundamentally and impossibly wrong.” Id. at 341. Currie came to ultimately agree
with the Van Dusen rule, absent Congressional legislation to the contrary, unless the plaintiff’s
original choice-of-forum would result in application of an unconstitutional choice of law. Id. There are
strong reasons to decouple the plaintiff’s choice of venue from choice-of-law considerations, but
because there are no federal choice-of-law rules to handle such questions, as Professor Marcus has
argued, the venue privilege prevails by default. Marcus, supra note 46, at 701.
60. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 636. The Court did not reference such legislative history in its Atlantic
Marine opinion.
61. Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
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imagine the Court deciding that the choice-of-law rules of the transferee
court should apply, because to do otherwise would create an anomalous
result: a case that would be dismissed by a state court persisting in the
transferee federal court under the choice-of-law rules of that state. But the
Court has yet to answer this question, perhaps understandably, since
doing so would require the Court to decide whether state or federal law
of forum non conveniens should apply in diversity cases, a question it
famously dodged in Piper Aircraft v. Reyno.62
However, the Court did answer the first of Van Dusen’s open
questions in Ferens v. John Deere, in which it held that a transferee
forum must “apply the law of the transferor court, regardless of who
initiates the transfer.”63 The Court, according to Justice Kennedy writing
for a 5-4 majority, was again willing to accept the plaintiff’s interstate
forum shopping in order to preserve the principle that the federal
transfer statute should not result in a change of applicable law. And, in
Ferens, the forum shopping was blatant: the plaintiff was a
Pennsylvanian injured by the defendant’s harvester in Pennsylvania. He
did not manage to file a tort action in Pennsylvania before that state’s
two-year statute of limitations had run. Instead, the plaintiff filed in
Mississippi federal court in an attempt to take advantage of that state’s
longer statute of limitations and then sought to transfer the case to
Pennsylvania, where he could take advantage of both the convenience of
his home forum and the benefits of Mississippi law.64
Over a vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia, the Court accepted the
plaintiff’s maneuvering on the grounds that
[a]pplying the transferee law . . . would undermine the Erie rule in a
serious way. It would mean that initiating a transfer under § 1404(a)
changes the state law applicable to a diversity case. . . . § 1404(a) [is] a
housekeeping measure that should not alter the state law governing a
case under Erie.

Additionally, the Court held, “[d]iversity jurisdiction did not eliminate
these forum shopping opportunities; instead, under Erie, the federal
courts had to replicate them.”65 The Court made clear that transfers
under § 1404(a) were to be decided purely on the basis of convenience,

62. 454 U.S. 235, 249 n.13 (1981); see also Hay et al., supra note 19, at 225 n.6; Gary B. Born &
Peter B. Rutledge, International Civil Litigation in United States Courts 453 (5th ed. 2011)
(noting that the Court did not resolve the question in Piper, but suggesting that the Court tipped its
hand in favor of federal law governing in American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 452 (1994));
Kevin M. Clermont, The Story of Piper: Forum Matters, in Civil Procedure Stories 199, 221 (Kevin
M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008) (noting that “although the lower federal courts still respectfully say that
this Erie question is not completely settled, the strong trend in these courts favors federal doctrine as
the governing law on forum non conveniens in the federal court”).
63. 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990).
64. Id. at 519–21.
65. Id. at 526–27.
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without assessment of the prejudice created by a change in the applicable
law or a normative assessment of the litigation conduct of the party
seeking the transfer. The Court worried that such considerations would
demand “extensive judicial time and resources.”66 The Court added,
“[f]oresight and judicial economy now seem to favor the simple rule that
the law does not change following a transfer of venue under § 1404(a).”67
And the Court again affirmed that it was uninterested in either
interfering with state choice-of-law rules or developing such rules as a
matter of federal common law.68 Ferens is far more vulnerable to
criticism than Van Dusen, and that criticism has been well stated.69 For the
purposes of this Article, however, it is important to see that the Court in
Ferens was, again, willing to tolerate even blatant interstate forum
shopping and refused to engage in analysis of the parties’ litigation
conduct as a basis for altering the applicable choice of law.70
The notion that a § 1404(a) transfer would not result in a change of
the applicable law was also at the heart of the Court’s decision in Stewart
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., in which the Court held that that the
federal transfer statute, and not state law, provides the standard for a
motion to change venue in federal court.71 Stewart was a diversity case
heard in federal court in Alabama.72 The defendant sought a transfer to a
Manhattan court, as mandated by the forum-selection clause in the parties’
contract.73 The plaintiff contended that the clause was unenforceable under
Alabama law, but a majority of the Court held that Alabama law was
preempted by the federal transfer statute, which demanded “balanc[ing]
a number of case-specific factors.”74 The clash between the federal transfer
statute and Alabama state law thus set up the Erie question. In the majority
opinion, applying the test from Hanna v. Plumer, Justice Marshall stated,
“Section 1404(a) is doubtless[ly] capable of classification as a procedural
rule, and indeed, we have so classified it in holding that a transfer pursuant

66. Id. at 529.
67. Id. at 530.
68. Id. at 532 (citing Robert Leflar, American Conflicts Law § 293 (3d ed. 1977) (arguing
against a federal common law of conflicts)).
69. See, e.g., Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C.
L. Rev. 527, 540 (2012) (referring to Ferens as an “unmitigated train wreck”); Kimberly Jade
Norwood, Double Forum Shopping and the Extension of Ferens to Federal Claims that Borrow State
Limitations Periods, 44 Emory L.J. 501, 543–48 (1995); Linda S. Mullenix, Badly Fractured Decisions
Muddy Cases on Venue, Nat’l L.J. Aug. 13 1990, at 4–5.
70. As Professor Mullenix’s contribution to this Symposium demonstrates, however, the Court’s
tolerance of plaintiffs’ forum shopping has not extended into many other areas. See generally Linda S.
Mullenix, Gaming the System: Protecting Consumers from Unconscionable Contractual ForumSelection and Arbitration Clauses, 66 Hastings L.J. 719 (2015).
71. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988).
72. Id. at 24.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 29.

BRADT_17 (EGK)

April 2015]

3/23/2015 5:07 PM

ATLANTIC MARINE AND CHOICE-OF-LAW FEDERALISM

631

to § 1404(a) does not carry with it a change in the applicable law.”75 As a
result, § 1404(a) would apply in federal diversity cases, despite Alabama’s
clashing state law.
Justice Marshall’s conclusion in this respect reflected that of the
victorious respondent, Ricoh, which argued in its brief that because
a transfer of venue pursuant to a choice-of-venue agreement in no way
affects the underlying body of federal or state law that will be
applicable to the dispute between the parties, it follows that the
designation of venue within the federal court system is merely a
procedural concern affecting the administration of the federal court
system.76

The reasoning in Stewart, therefore, seems to demand that the defendant
be able to achieve a geographical transfer but not a change in choice-oflaw rules. And, again, in holding that Stewart did not overrule Van
Dusen in the forum-selection context, the Court indicated its willingness
to abide the choice-of-law impact of plaintiff’s interstate forum
shopping.77

II. ATLANTIC MARINE and Implications for Choice of Law
In Atlantic Marine, the Court backed away from the three strands
of thinking that emerged from the choice-of-law cases described above:
(1) preference for intrastate uniformity over interstate uniformity;
(2) tolerance of plaintiffs’ gamesmanship in forum shopping; and
(3) recognition of states’ choice-of-law practices as substantive law
unaffected by change of federal venue. In sum, these cases had led the
Court to conclude repeatedly that a transfer of a diversity case under
§ 1404(a) did not result in a change of the law applicable to a plaintiff’s
case, even if that conclusion vindicated forum shopping. In Atlantic
Marine, for the first time, the Court held the opposite: a transfer under
§ 1404(a) does result in a change of the applicable choice-of-law rules in
diversity cases.78 The Court’s explicit reasoning for doing so was to
prevent plaintiffs from reaping the choice-of-law benefits of interstate
forum shopping.79 In creating the new rule, the Court had nothing to say
about the principle of intrastate uniformity or the status of choice-of-law
rules as substantive law, which should not be altered due to the accident
of diversity. Moreover, the Court created an exceptionally difficult future

75. Id. at 32.
76. Brief for Respondent at 11, Stewart, 487 U.S. 22 (No. 86-1908).
77. See Julia L. Erickson, Comment: Forum Selection Clauses in Light of the Erie Doctrine and
Federal Common Law: Stewart Organization Inc. v. Ricoh Corporation, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 1090, 1115
(1988) (explaining that “some forum shopping is possible regardless of whether state or federal law is
applied in diversity”).
78. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 582–83 (2013).
79. Id.
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question: what should a court do in a diversity case when the forum
state’s law would refuse to enforce the forum-selection clause, but the
transfer statute would? Because Atlantic Marine went beyond Stewart
by mandating a change in the applicable choice-of-law rules, that
question has become far more difficult.
A. What ATLANTIC MARINE Did
In Atlantic Marine, for the first time, the Court created an exception
to the Van Dusen/Ferens rule by holding, “when a party bound by a
forum-selection clause flouts its contractual obligation and files suit in a
different forum, a § 1404(a) transfer of venue will not carry with it the
original venue’s choice-of-law rules.”80 The Court did not hold that the
Atlantic Marine plaintiff, J-Crew Management, Inc., filed its suit in a
forum rendered “wrong” or “improper” by the rules of venue and
personal jurisdiction.81 Instead, the Court held that the forum-selection
clause should be enforced through application of the transfer statute “in
the interest of justice,” and the case should almost certainly be transferred
to the Eastern District of Virginia, one of the courts chosen in the
parties’ contract.82 The Court implicitly acknowledged that under normal
circumstances, because this was a transferred diversity case, the Virginia
district court would be required to apply the choice-of-law rules of the
state of Texas, the state of the transferor court. But the Court made
clear: “[W]e will not apply the Van Dusen rule when a transfer stems
from enforcement of a valid forum-selection clause: The court in the
contractually selected venue should not apply the law of the transferor
venue to which the parties waived their right.”83
In so holding, the Court described the policy underlying Van Dusen
as to “prevent ‘defendants, properly subjected to suit in the transferor
State,’ from ‘invok[ing] § 1404(a) to gain the benefits of the laws of
another jurisdiction.”84 The limited discussion of choice of law in the oral
80. Id. at 582.
81. Id. at 579.
82. Id. at 584. The Court did not affect the transfer, but remanded the case to determine whether
public interest factors supported a denial of the transfer motion. But the Court provided guidance
when it noted that no such factors were “apparent on the record before [it].”
83. Id. at 583.
84. Id. at 582 (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 638 (1964)). It is interesting to note
that the Court also classified Van Dusen as an “exception” to the Klaxon “principle” that a federal
court sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits. This is sleight of
hand. It is true, as I have written, that Van Dusen is an “exception from the letter of the Klaxon rule”
because it does mean that the transferee court applies a different state’s choice-of-law rules. Andrew
D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 88 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 759, 779 (2012). But it is not right to imply, as the Supreme Court did, that Van Dusen
“identified an exception to [the Klaxon] principle,” as though the Court has regularly done such a
thing. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582. Van Dusen did not disregard the Klaxon principle in the slightest. To
the contrary, as I have noted above, it was an application of all of the policies underlying the Klaxon rule.
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argument emphasized the same grounds.85 This is, however, a rather thin
reading of Van Dusen, and, for better or worse, it entirely ignores the
reasoning of Ferens. The holding in Van Dusen was not meant only to
preserve a plaintiff’s venue privilege, although it did emphasize that
effect of the rule it created. The Van Dusen Court was also attuned to
the problems of intrastate disuniformity created by the transfer statute
and was willing to accept, almost apologetically, the “gamesmanship”
that the Atlantic Marine Court sought to prevent.86 The Van Dusen
Court also rejected the notion that the transferee court should apply a
different set of choice-of-law rules when the plaintiff selected a forum in
which venue was proper and there was personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. In so holding, the Court explicitly stated that it did not want
to engage in federal common law making in the area of choice-of-law or
displace the choice-of-law rules of a state with jurisdiction over the case.
Moreover, the Ferens court was unwilling to deprive the plaintiff of the
choice-of-law benefits of obvious gamesmanship on the ground that
doing so would permit disuniformity in the federal courts.87 The Ferens
majority explicitly wanted no part in creating exceptions to Van Dusen
based on a judgment about plaintiff’s forum shopping for fear of
becoming enmeshed in addressing the problem in similar cases.88 But the
Atlantic Marine Court was far more willing to cast aspersions on the
plaintiff’s actions and to deprive it of the choice-of-law benefits of those
actions.
B. Observations About the Court’s New Choice-of-Law Rule
What is interesting about the Court’s Atlantic Marine rule? For one
thing, the Court’s new rule signals a willingness to depart from the
cornerstone principles that had animated its prior choice-of-law cases.
This has interesting implications for the future of the Court’s Erie and
Nor did the Van Dusen Court think it was creating an “exception” to the Klaxon “principle.” It referred
to the argument that Klaxon required the transferee court to apply its home state’s choice-of-law rules as
a “superficial reading” that “directly contradicts the fundamental Erie doctrine which the quoted
formulations were designed to express.” Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 637–38. The notion that Atlantic Marine
was a straightforward application of Klaxon, while Van Dusen was an “exception,” is difficult to swallow.
85. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 26, 42. As Justice Ginsburg stated: “Van Dusen
against Barrack was intended to give the plaintiff plaintiff’s choice of initial forum. If plaintiff chooses
a forum in violation of the contract, there’s no reason why Van Dusen should apply.” Id. at 26. She
later added that “if the Plaintiff chooses a forum in violation of the contract, the whole rationale of
[Van Dusen] falls.” Id. at 41.
86. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 633–34 (“Of course [the rule] allow[s] plaintiffs to retain whatever
advantages may flow from the state laws of the forum they have initially selected. There is nothing,
however, in the language or policy of § 1404(a) to justify its use by defendants to defeat the advantages
accruing to plaintiffs who have chosen a forum which, although it was inconvenient, was a proper
venue.”); see also Marcus, supra note 46, at 686.
87. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 529 (1990).
88. Id. at 530.
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choice-of-law jurisprudence. But the Court’s willingness to depart from
Van Dusen in Atlantic Marine may also be thought of as part of a larger
trend of restricting plaintiffs’ forum choices and the associated choice-oflaw effects. While the Court was willing to live with such conduct in
Klaxon and its progeny, the Atlantic Marine rule suggests a much more
searching eye. In a sense, the Court’s refusal to allow plaintiffs to evade
forum-selection clauses seems to outweigh the desire to avoid intrastate
disuniformity and leave states’ choice-of-law decisions alone.

1.

Intrastate Disuniformity

One hallmark of the Court’s prior opinions in this area was a
willingness to accept some degree of interstate disuniformity in exchange
for intrastate uniformity. That is, the Court tolerated different state
choice-of-law rules, and therefore different outcomes, in order to
preserve the uniformity of results in state and federal courts within the
same state. In the transfer area, the Court was careful to ensure that the
opportunity to change venue to a district in a different state, which was
not available in the state courts, would not affect the choice-of-law rules
that applied.
The lower federal courts, however, have never applied this rule to
every transfer within the federal system. To begin with, courts have
reached consensus that the Van Dusen rule does not apply to transfers
from an improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).89 This rule makes the
most sense in cases in which the plaintiff has filed in a federal district
court in a state in which he could not have filed the same case in that
state’s courts. Under those circumstances, allowing the plaintiff to
achieve a choice-of-law benefit in federal court that could not have been
obtained in state court would violate the mandate of intrastate uniformity
in Klaxon.90 The refusal to extend the Van Dusen rule to transfers under
89. 15 Wright et al., supra note 45, § 3846 (“Clearly, the holding in Van Dusen—that the transferee
in a diversity of citizenship case applies the choice-of-law rules that the transferor court would have
applied—should not apply in Section 1406(a) transfers or when the transferor court lacked personal
jurisdiction. To apply Van Dusen in such cases would permit the plaintiff to file suit in an improper forum
and ‘capture’ presumably favorable choice-of-law rules. Thus, courts agree that Van Dusen does not
apply if the transferor court was an improper venue or lacked personal jurisdiction. In such cases, the
transferee court applies the choice-of-law rules it would have applied had the action been filed there
originally.”).
90. See, e.g., Gerena v. Korb, 617 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 2010) (“If a district court receives a case
pursuant to a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), for improper venue, or 28 U.S.C. § 1631, for want of
jurisdiction, it logically applies the law of the state in which it sits, since the original venue, with its
governing laws, was never a proper option.”); Lafferty v. St. Riel, 495 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2007)
(“When cases have been transferred for improper venue, transferee courts generally apply the
substantive law they would have applied had the action been brought there initially.”); Ellis v. Great
Sw. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1110 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[F]ollowing a section 1406(a) transfer, regardless of
which party requested the transfer or the purpose behind the transfer, the transferee court must apply
the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits.”).
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§ 1406(a) is also rather uncontroversial in light of the Van Dusen Court’s
statement that it left open the question of the application of its rule to a
case that would be dismissed in a state court on forum non conveniens
grounds. It stands to reason that if a case could not be maintained in a
state court—and therefore could not be decided under that state’s
choice-of-law rules—the choice-of-law rules should not follow the case
after a transfer that could not be achieved between state courts.91
In Atlantic Marine, however, the Supreme Court held that to
enforce a forum-selection clause, the proper vehicle to transfer was
§ 1404(a), not § 1406(a).92 In the Court’s view, this was because the
original venue the plaintiff chose was not “improper” under the venue
statute or personal jurisdiction problem. Instead, the Court held that
such a transfer was, in the words of § 1404(a), for “the convenience of
parties and witnesses” and “in the interest of justice.” As a result,
Atlantic Marine presents the possibility of a much harder case.
The harder case is that of a plaintiff who, flouting the forumselection clause, files a case in a state hostile to enforcing forum-selection
clauses.93 If the defendant is unable to remove the case to federal court,
then the plaintiff’s chosen state court would refuse, presumably applying
its law, to grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss the case on forum non
conveniens grounds and proceed to decide it pursuant to its own choiceof-law rules.94 If there is diversity of citizenship, and the defendant is not a
citizen of the state in which the plaintiff filed the suit, the defendant may
remove the case to federal court and achieve a transfer to the forum
chosen in the contract, as mandated by Stewart and now Atlantic
Marine.95 That transfer would have been impossible had the defendant

91. See Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs, Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982, 992 (11th
Cir. 1982) (refusing to apply Van Dusen rule when cases are transferred under § 1404(a) for lack of
personal jurisdiction in the filing state), According to the Eleventh Circuit,
[s]uch abuses by plaintiffs would be precisely the type that Van Dusen sought to prevent on
the part of defendants. A rule allowing them would defeat the goal of uniformity articulated
in Erie and elaborated in Van Dusen, by producing different outcomes, depending on
whether the action is initially brought in state or federal court.

Id.
92. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. District Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 579–80 (2013).
93. See Born & Rutledge, supra note 62, at 469 (noting that the standards for enforcement of a
choice-of-forum clause in the United States continue to vary significantly in different jurisdictions); Hay
et al., supra note 19, at 545 (noting efforts by states to protect consumers and that “while federal doctrine
has been enormously persuasive to states, important distinctions between state and federal court practice
are likely to continue and state innovations may well produce improvements to the law in this area”).
94. See Born & Rutledge, supra note 62, at 469–70 (describing the unresolved state of the law in
many states regarding the enforceability of forum-selection clauses); Leandra Lederman, Note, Viva
Zapata! Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases,
66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 422, 429 n.41 (1991).
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (allowing removal of cases over which federal courts would
have original jurisdiction); id. § 1441(b)(2) (providing that removal is not available to a defendant who

BRADT_17 (EGK)

636

3/23/2015 5:07 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:617

been a citizen of the same state as the plaintiff, or if the defendant was a
citizen of the state in which the plaintiff originally sued.
Prior to Atlantic Marine, Stewart seemed to indicate that the
transfer would not carry with it a change in applicable choice-of-law
rules. Post-Atlantic Marine, however, it appears clear that the transferee
forum will apply its choice-of-law rules after the transfer. The defendant
is therefore able to achieve both a different forum and choice of law
based on the “accident of diversity of citizenship.”96 Atlantic Marine,
therefore, may allow exactly the sort of intrastate disuniformity that
Klaxon, Van Dusen, and Ferens forswore.97
In Atlantic Marine, the Court simply assumed that the forumselection clause at issue was “valid,” and therefore did not address the
implications of the harder question that remains. Interestingly, however,
even prior to Atlantic Marine, some federal courts already applied the
choice-of-law rules of the transferee court when a case was transferred
pursuant to a forum-selection clause, even if that transfer was effectuated
under § 1404(a) and the plaintiff’s chosen forum was otherwise proper.98
And, as the contribution to this Symposium by Professor Clermont
amply demonstrates, most federal courts currently follow federal law
with respect to the enforceability of a forum-selection clause,99 though
the question remains open in the Supreme Court.100 These lower courts’
subsequent conclusion that the transferee courts’ choice-of-law rules
should apply is not terribly surprising for the same reason the Court’s
choice-of-law rule in Atlantic Marine was not surprising—it would seem

is a citizen of the state in which he was sued if federal subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity
of citizenship).
96. Klaxon v. Stentor, 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
97. Hay et al., supra note 19, at 543–44 (“Application of federal law has, of course, the advantage
of reducing the incentive for interstate forum shopping, although application of state law preserves
uniformity of outcome as between a federal court and its home state’s courts.”).
98. See, e.g., Artistic Stone Crafters, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 726 F. Supp. 2d 595, 600 (E.D.
Va. 2010) (holding that “an exception to the Van Dusen rule applies when a Section 1404(a) transfer is
made pursuant to a forum selection clause, and in such cases the law of the state of the transferee
court is to be applied”); Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., 594 F. Supp. 2d 945, 976 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(refusing to apply the Van Dusen rule when enforcing a forum-selection clause on the ground that it
would “allow the plaintiff to manipulate the choice-of-law-rules to be applied”); Freedman v. Am.
Online, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 638, 652 (E.D. Va. 2004) (holding that “to apply the laws of the transferor
state in such circumstances, would allow a plaintiff to file a claim in a court without proper venue to
avoid the effect of a contractual forum selection clause and the unfavorable choice-of-law that would
otherwise have resulted”).
99. See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements,
66 Hastings L.J. 643 (2015).
100. See generally Mullenix, supra note 70; see also Born & Rutledge, supra note 62, at 531
(noting that the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question whether federal or state law
applies to the enforceability of forum clauses in diversity cases); Jason Webb Yackee, Choice of Law

Considerations in the Validity & Enforcement of International Forum Selection Agreements: Whose
Law Applies?, 9 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Aff. 43, 64–67 (2004).
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insufficient to give the defendant the benefit of the location of the forumselection clause but not that forum’s choice-of-law rules. The result,
though, is that even in cases in which the state in which the federal court
sits would not enforce the forum-selection clause, the federal court will
both effect a geographic transfer of the case and require application of
the transferee state’s choice-of-law rules. In such cases, then, not only
does diversity jurisdiction potentially lead to a different applicable law in
federal versus state court, but the courts reach this conclusion based on a
determination of unacceptable manipulation by the plaintiff.
This practice, now mandated by the Court, adds significant bite to
the Court’s holding in Stewart, where Justice Marshall, for the majority,
cited the Van Dusen language about § 1404(a) being only a
housekeeping measure. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this conclusion in
Ferens,101 when Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, cited Stewart
for the proposition that “§ 1404(a) may pre-empt state law. In general,
however, we have seen § 1404(a) as a housekeeping measure that should
not alter the state law governing a case under Erie.”102
Under Atlantic Marine, diversity jurisdiction now may not only
result in a transfer that would not otherwise be available in state court,
but also a change in applicable choice-of-law rules, making it tougher to
contend that the statute is procedural for Erie purposes. This is so
particularly in light of the Court’s holding in Klaxon that choice-of-law
rules are substantive law for Erie purposes. This observation does not
necessarily mean that if the Court were to hold that such a change in
choice of law were part and parcel of the transfer statute, the transfer
statute would now run afoul of the lenient test for congressional statutes
adopted in Hanna, but it does make it a closer call. And, even though the
statute may not fail the Hanna test, it does create new tension with
Klaxon, which rested on the ground that a state’s choice-of-law rules are
substantive law that should not change in federal court due to the
accident of diversity.
The Court might, however, have charted a different course—and
perhaps it still might should the “harder case” arise. Having decided that
the appropriate mechanism to transfer was § 1404(a) and not § 1406, the
Court should consider fashioning a rule more sensitive to the concerns
underlying Klaxon and Van Dusen and those Justice Marshall expressed
in Stewart. Such a rule ought to distinguish between states that would
dismiss the plaintiff’s action on forum non conveniens grounds and those
that would not. If the state in which the plaintiff files would dismiss the

101. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 526 (1990).
102. Id. at 526; see also id. at 528 (“Van Dusen also made clear that the decision to transfer venue
under § 1404(a) should turn on considerations of convenience rather than on the possibility of
prejudice resulting from a change in the applicable law.”).
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plaintiff’s action for forum non conveniens, then the choice-of-law rule
stated in Atlantic Marine should apply. But if the state in which the
plaintiff files would not dismiss the case, then the court should transfer
the case, but the transferee court should apply the choice-of-law rules of
the state in which the transferor court sits. Judge Leisure of the Southern
District of New York followed this approach in a thorough opinion
issued shortly after Stewart, in Caribbean Wholesale Services Corp. v.
US JVC Corp.103 In his opinion, Judge Leisure noted:
Foremost among the virtues of this solution is its fidelity to the
principles of Erie. The same substantive law will apply whether a party
commences suit in federal or state court. The opportunities for forum
shopping between state and federal court will thereby be eliminated. In
addition, this solution is consistent with the concerns of Ferens and
Stewart that a transfer pursuant to § 1404(a) should remain a
“housekeeping measure” rather than a determination of substantive
law; the applicable law will depend not on whether the case is
transferred but on whether the state courts of the transferor state
would have dismissed the case for forum non conveniens.104

The Supreme Court, of course, did not consider such an alternative
in Atlantic Marine, as there was almost no argument about choice of law
at all. One wonders, however, whether any such argument would have
made a difference. Adoption of an approach like Judge Leisure’s was
unlikely for several reasons, the most important being that it would cut
against the Court’s complete embrace of forum-selection clauses.105
Indeed, the lower courts have already by and large adopted the Atlantic
Marine approach. But this approach would have preserved the underlying
principles of Klaxon and Van Dusen while achieving some of the benefits
of enforcing the forum-selection clause. Instead, the Court went wholehog in favor of forum-selection clauses, letting the choice-of-law chips
fall where they may.
One possibility is that the Court will someday view a forumselection clause that would not be enforced by a state court as “invalid”
in a federal court sitting in that state out of respect for state law. Under
such circumstances, the Court could consider ordering the geographical
transfer but not the change in applicable choice-of-law rules. But given
the Court’s enthusiasm for enforcing forum-selection clauses, and its
complete disregard for the problem in Atlantic Marine, chances for a
more fine-tuned rule seem slim.

103. 855 F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
104. Id. at 632. No other federal courts appear to have followed this approach.
105. This approach would also be marginally more complicated to apply, though not especially so.
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2.

Policing Plaintiffs’ Choice-of-Law Gamesmanship
In Klaxon, Van Dusen, and Ferens, the Court was aware of the

potential for interstate forum shopping its opinions wrought. In all three
cases, especially Ferens, the Court was willing to accept plaintiffs’ ability
to choose among proper forums based on their different choice-of-law
rules. In large part, this was accepted as part of the plaintiff’s venue
privilege, but it was also in the service of Erie principles generally and a
desire to avoid case-by-case judgments about plaintiffs’ conduct. Atlantic
Marine took the opposite view. It considered a plaintiff’s filing in a
forum other than the one selected by the forum-selection clause as
“inappropriately fil[ing] suit,” “flout[ing]” the contract, and unworthy of
the benefits of the Van Dusen rule.106 That is a reasonable conclusion,
but it is a step in the direction of greater willingness on the Court’s part
to police plaintiffs’ strategic behavior in the future.
For starters, one could certainly imagine the Court revisiting Ferens.
Aside from Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion for a 5-4
Court, and Justice Scalia, who dissented, the membership of the Court
has changed entirely since the Court decided Ferens in 1990. Indeed,
although the Court cited Ferens in Atlantic Marine and could distinguish
Ferens on the ground that the plaintiffs in that case did not “waive” their
venue privilege as the Atlantic Marine plaintiff did by virtue of a forumselection clause,107 it is difficult to imagine this Court deciding Ferens in
the same way today. The Court’s tone overall suggests that a plaintiff’s
filing suit in an inconvenient forum while also seeking the choice-of-law
benefits of that forum would be equally “inappropriate.”108
If this is correct, and the Court’s Atlantic Marine rule represents a
shift toward a normative assessment of plaintiff forum shopping, it might
also portend depriving plaintiffs of the choice-of-law benefits of forum
selection in other kinds of cases where such behavior could be detected.
One example might be in multidistrict litigation (“MDL”), in which
plaintiffs often have several choices of initial filing forum, which they
might choose with little drawback given that filing will be followed almost
immediately by a transfer to the MDL court. In such cases, plaintiffs are
able to take advantage of forum shopping to obtain better law with little
impact if the chosen forum is inconvenient. In the spirit of Atlantic
Marine, MDL courts might decide that in such cases, the plaintiff’s forum
shopping is inappropriate and warrants a departure from the Van Dusen
rule, especially if the case is filed after the MDL has been established and
the court has sanctioned direct filing into the MDL. Such a move would
be a significant departure from the dogma that an MDL transfer is only
106. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 582–83 (2013).
107. Id. at 583.
108. This, of course, would require the Court actually taking an interest in the Ferens problem.
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for “pretrial proceedings,” but one could imagine a lower court charting
such a course in an effort to simplify its choice-of-law task.109
In any event, the “choice of choice-of-law rules rule” that the Court
created in Atlantic Marine may also provide a way to police plaintiffs’
and states’ choice-of-law decisions without the Court’s needing to
substantively review states’ choice-of-law decisions under the Due
Process or Full Faith and Credit Clauses. As noted above, the Court has
been loath to substantively review states’ choice-of-law rules since the
1930s. This is in part due to the Court’s inability to develop workable
principles for making such decisions, but is also likely due to pragmatic
considerations counseling against the Court having to take on such a
potentially onerous task. One way to accomplish the goal of policing
states’ choice-of-law decisions without inquiring into the content of
states’ choice-of-law rules is to limit plaintiffs’ choice of forum. By
preventing a plaintiff from invoking a state’s choice-of-law rules, the
Court could avoid having to deal with them at all. Atlantic Marine might
be seen as employing this strategy. By creating a rule that provides that a
forum-selection clause also chooses choice-of-law rules, the Court has
effectively prevented the plaintiff from choosing a different forum whose
choice-of-law rules might defeat the forum-selection clause. As a result,
the Court can prevent application of those choice-of-law rules without
having to reject their substance as unconstitutional.
In this way, the Atlantic Marine rule is consistent with the Court’s
recent forays into personal jurisdiction. In the quartet of cases the Court
has heard since 2010, it has rejected jurisdiction in all of them, taking
what could be considered a more restrictive view of both general and
specific jurisdiction.110 Atlantic Marine falls in the same category of forumrestrictive rules, limiting the plaintiff’s ability to shop for preferable
choice-of-law rules, and preventing the Court from having to pass
judgment on those rules. The personal jurisdiction cases accomplish this
goal by ensuring that a plaintiff’s contacts with a state are especially
strong, meaning a state’s choice to apply forum law is unlikely to run
afoul of constitutional restrictions.111 The Atlantic Marine rule

109. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 36, at 573 (noting judges’ tendency to “[distort] and misus[e]
choice of law to produce some pseudo-federal law or federal law equivalent” in complex cases).
110. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
111. Professors von Mehren and Trautman noted this very possibility in their classic article on
personal jurisdiction. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1132–33 (1966) (“The Court might well find itself under
increasing pressure to refine and strengthen the constitutional controls on choice of law suggested by
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick. The Court could also move in the direction of holding unconstitutional those
exercises of jurisdiction that are not clearly justified by the relation of the parties litigant to the forum
or by other litigational and enforcement considerations, unless the community asserting jurisdiction
had a significant substantive-law concern that the choice-of-law rules of another forum could not
accommodate. More generally, the Supreme Court might well tighten standards and be less permissive
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accomplishes this goal by formally eliminating any notion of unfair
surprise associated with a state’s application of forum law. Together, the
cases take pressure off the Court potentially having to review state’s
choices of law or develop federal choice-of-law principles in diversity
cases.112 As a result, despite the Court’s relatively restrictive posture
toward plaintiffs and its attention to the purported evils of forum
shopping in recent procedure cases,113 and its possible turn back toward
territorial thinking in personal jurisdiction,114 one can expect that the
relatively lax Allstate standard will remain unchanged.

Conclusion
The Court’s choice-of-law holding in Atlantic Marine is, in one
sense, unsurprising. The Court’s enthusiasm for forum-selection clauses
almost requires this result. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that this
Court would decide that the transfer statute demands enforcement of
almost all forum-selection agreements but allow plaintiffs to achieve
application of different law by filing first in a different forum. But the
Court’s new rule does mark a step in a different direction from its earlier
choice-of-law holdings in Klaxon, Van Dusen, and Ferens, by explicitly
sanctioning intrastate disuniformity and punishing plaintiffs for interstate
forum shopping. The Court’s restriction on plaintiffs’ ability to shop for
plaintiff-friendly choice-of-law rules reduces potential pressure on the
Court to ever have to engage in constitutional review of the substance of
those rules themselves. Whether the Court’s choice-of-law approach in
Atlantic Marine signals a new trend remains to be seen, but it does
represent a different orientation to state choice-of-law rules in federal
courts.

with respect to state assertions of jurisdiction than has yet been the case.”); see also Stewart E. Sterk,
Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 1163, 1166–67 (2013) (discussing the ability
of limitations of personal jurisdiction to limit choice of law).
112. For instance, the Court’s recent general jurisdiction cases may solve the Ferens problem for it.
John Deere was not incorporated in Mississippi, and Mississippi was not its principal place of business.
As a result, post-Goodyear and Daimler, it is possible that there would be no personal jurisdiction
over Ferens’ case in Mississippi, meaning that personal jurisdiction limitations might prevent the
application of Mississippi’s then-outré choice-of-law rule. Professor Stein suggests this might be the
case. See Stein, supra note 69, at 547–48.
113. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private
Enforcement, 17 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 637, 656–59 (2013); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading,

Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal
Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 286, 352 (2013) (expressing concern that McIntyre will allow the
“personal jurisdiction defense [to] become yet another procedural stop sign, one posted at the very
genesis of the case”).
114. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789–90 (2011).
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